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Abstract 
 
Previous research has focused on equity as a prime determinant of mortgage default 
propensities.  This paper extends the analysis of mortgage default to include mortgages 
that require no down payment from the purchaser.    A continuous time hazard model is 
used to estimate the conditional probability of a serious delinquency, or a claim, as a 
function of a host of standard control variables, and indicators for the presence and 
source of the down payment.   The data consist of a nationally representative random 
sample of about 5,000 FHA insured single family mortgages endorsed in Fiscal Years 
2000, 2001, and 2002, observed through September 30, 2006, and samples of about 1,000 
FHA loans each from the Atlanta, Indianapolis, and Salt Lake City MSAs in the same 
time period.  The results indicate that borrowers who provide down payments from their 
own resources have significantly lower default propensities than do borrowers whose 
down payments come from relatives, government agencies, or non-profits.  Borrowers 
with down payments from seller-funded non-profits, who make no down payment at all, 
have the highest default rates.  Additionally, borrowers who do not make down payments 
from their own resources tend to have higher loss given default in the small subset of 
loans that had completed the property disposition process.   
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The idea that equity plays an important role in the homeowner's decision to default is 
longstanding in the academic literaturei.   Empirical estimates of the relationship between 
equity and default go at least as far back as Herzog and Earley (1970), and a firm 
theoretical underpinning for the decision to default was provided by Kau and Kim (1994).  
Equity can come in two flavors – initial equity in the form of the down payment when a 
home is purchased, and contemporaneous equity, which adds in price appreciation (or 
depreciation) post purchase, amortization, and sometimes changes in the market value of 
the mortgage balance.  Research finds that contemporaneous equity has a strong 
influence on credit risk, and some papers, such as Harrison, Noordewier, and Yavas 
(2004) find that initial equity has a modest additional impact, over and above its effect on 
contemporaneous equity, perhaps because it reflects the household's ability to save, or 
because it is more precisely measured than accumulated equity.   
 
In standard financial models of loan default, so-called “ruthless default”, such as Kau and 
Kim (1994), the source of the down payment should be irrelevant.  If property value is 
sufficiently below the loan balance, the borrower should default.  Many empirical 
models, however, have stressed the importance of “trigger events” such as 
unemployment, illness, or divorce, which can produce cash flow problems leading to 
diminished equity, as the delinquent payments are added to the loan balance, and 
resulting in eventual default.  Source of down payment has not previously been 
considered in default modeling, but the relationship between default and the source of the 
borrower's down payment may be related to trigger events.  Borrowers who are capable 
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of increasing their saving, or increasing their labor earnings, in response to unforeseen 
events may be less susceptible to trigger events.  The need to save for a down payment 
may serve to separate those who can more readily increase saving and earnings from 
those who find it more difficult.  Krumm and Kelly (1989) find that savings and the 
transition to homeownership are endogenous, while Haurin, Wachter, and Hendershott 
(1995) find that labor earnings of households often increase prior to entering 
homeownership.  Both of these studies covered time periods in which zero down loans 
were generally unavailable.  Presumably the need to accumulate a down payment drives 
this savings and earnings behavior, and eliminating the need to accumulate a down 
payment would draw in others in less flexible circumstances.   
 
Another reason that source of down payment may be important is the case of seller-
funded non-profits.  Lenders and insurers generally limit the amount of assistance that 
sellers can provide to buyers, presumably because this assistance can make a round-trip, 
to the extent that selling prices are increased when seller-funded assistance is present.  
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and private mortgage insurers often limit the amount of seller-
assistance to 3% of the transaction price, and FHA limits the amount of seller-assistance 
to 6%.  However, since 1997 FHA has allowed seller-funded non-profits to donate funds 
to purchasers using FHA mortgages, and then bill the sellers for the amount of the 
donation plus a transaction fee.  This funding is not counted against the 6% limitation on 
seller provided funds.  HUD's Office of the Inspector General (HUD 2000, 2002) and 
GAO (2005b)ii have found that sales prices of homes using seller-funded non-profits tend 
to reflect the assistance.  If this assistance causes sellers to raise the price beyond the 
market clearing price based on arms' length transactions, the maximum allowable loan 
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value increases.   The apparent equity in these transactions would not exist and they 
would be, in effect, nothing down mortgages, as the loan amount would cover the full 
cost of the transaction, price plus closing costs.  
 
A handful of studies sponsored by HUD or by seller-funded non-profits have examined 
the relationship between source of down payment and claim and delinquency rates. In the 
two HUD OIG studies cited above, 90 day delinquency rates were compared for FHA 
single family loans originated in 4 MSAs, Sacramento, Stockton, Indianapolis, and Las 
Vegas, over the time period 1997-1999.  About 2,000 loans that had received seller-
funded assistance through the largest down payment assistance program, Nehemiah, were 
compared to other FHA loans in these 4 cities.  In the first study, examining 
delinquencies through 1999, assisted loans had double the delinquency rate of unassisted 
loans, while the second study examined delinquency on the same set of loans through 
February 2002, and also found seller funded assistance doubled the delinquency rate.  In 
response to these studies, a coalition of seller-funded non-profits, the Homeownership 
Alliance of Nonprofit Downpayment Providers (HAND), commissioned a CPA firm to 
examine delinquency rates for FHA borrowers in states where seller-funded non-profits 
were active, and compare delinquency rates for loans with non-profit assistance to loans 
with other forms of down payment assistance, such as gifts from relatives or government 
programs (Reznick, Fedder and Silverman 2003).  This study found elevated delinquency 
rates for all forms of assistance, and found that non-profit assistance delinquency was 
comparable to delinquency rates of loans with assistance in other forms.  Both the OIG 
studies and the HAND study fail to hold constant many important variables.  For 
example, the OIG studies do not differentiate between loans with various loan-to-value 
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ratios, and use a data source that does not include the borrower's credit score.  The 
HAND study does limit it's sample to high LTV loans, but does not have credit scores 
and, more importantly, compares loans over different “default windows.” Delinquency 
status as of May 2003 was examined for loans originated between 1997 and 2001.  Since 
the use of seller-funded non-profit assistance has grown rapidly, from less than 1% of 
FHA purchase loans in 1997 to about 10% of FHA purchase loans in 2001 (GAO 2005b), 
the failure to control for the length of the default window means that the loans with 
seller-funded down payment assistance had, on average, much shorter default windows 
than did the loans to which they were compared. 
 
While the source of the down payment has not generally been considered in academic 
studies of default, several studies have looked at the importance of down payment 
assistance to homeownership.  Linneman and Wachter (1989) first examined the extent to 
which households are down payment constrained.  Mayer and Engelheart (1996) 
document first time home buyer's growing reliance on gift assistance, often from 
relatives.   However, none of these studies consider the effect of lowered down payment 
constraints from conventional lenders, or the proliferation since 1997 of seller-funded 
down payment assistance non-profits.  Herbert and Tsen (2005) consider the potential for 
down payment assistance in the current environment.  Two HUD sponsored studies of 
seller funded nonprofits by the Concentrance Corporation document the substantial 
growth in gift assistance in the FHA portfolio, and summarize focus groups with 
borrowers, lenders, and real estate agents, who report higher prices, and higher 
delinquency and claim rates for loans with seller-funded assistance.  The borrower focus 
groups staged by Concentrance (Concentrance 2005) also report substantial confusion 
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among borrowers as to the source of the assistance and the involvement of the seller and 
the non-profit in the transaction.  One study of seller-funded nonprofits, done by the 
Millken Institute and sponsored by Nehemiah, (Wong, Murphy, Fogelbach and Koepp 
2004), interviewed users of seller-funded gift assistance from Nehemiah, and examined 
property tax records for homes purchased with Nehemiah assistance.  The authors found 
that local jurisdictions collected substantial tax revenue from these properties, but did not 
estimate tax collections in a counter-factual case of no Nehemiah assistance.  They also 
found substantial satisfaction with the program among the buyers, but since the sample 
design only included purchasers who were still in their homes several years after 
purchase, the sample frame would have missed borrowers who had experienced 
foreclosure, or a forced sale to prevent foreclosure.  
 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and the trends in 
default and gift assistance.  Section 3 discusses the estimation strategy and the CTM 
software used to estimate the model.  Section 4 provides the results for 90 day 
delinquency, claims, prepayments, and loss given default.  Section 5 offers concluding 
remarks and some observations regarding policy. 
 
2. Data 
 
2.1 Concentrance Sample 
 
The data for this paper consist of a nationally representative sample of just over 5,000 
FHA single family purchase money loans, endorsed in Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, and 
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2002, that is, from October 1999 to September 2002.  These loans were drawn by 
Concentrance Corp, a HUD contractor, for a HUD sponsored study of down payment 
assistance.iii  This file is one of only two large random samples of seasoned FHA loans 
with FICO scoresiv, as HUD only began the routine collection of FICO scores as part of 
their Single Family Data Warehouse (SFDW) in 2004.  In addition to FICO scores, the 
file contained many fields from the SFDW, such as the initial LTV ratio, mortgage 
payment, borrower income, type of mortgage, term, interest rate, and street address of the 
borrower.  This file was merged with a July 2005v extract of the SFDW containing dates 
for prepayment of the loans that paid off early, date of first 90 day delinquency reported 
by the lender, and date of claim for loans that terminated with a loss to FHA, and the loss 
(or, for 12 foreclosures, profit) for loans that had completed the property disposition 
process.  In October of 2006 HUD provided to GAO another extract from the SFDW with 
the dates of delinquency, and of claim and non-claim terminations through September 30, 
2006, and the loss figures for all REO cases resolved through September 2006.vi 
 
In addition to the national file, Concentrance drew random samples of about 1,000 loans 
from each of three MSAs, Atlanta, Indianapolis, and Salt Lake City, over the same time 
period.  These MSAs were selected by HUD because of their high incidence of seller-
funded down payment assistance. 
 
The samples were limited to loans with LTV ratios greater than 95%, as defined in 
HUD's SFDW.  Since HUD's definition of LTV excludes the upfront mortgage insurance 
premium, which is generally rolled into the mortgage, in effect almost all of these loans 
had LTV ratios, as conventionally defined, greater than 96.5%, as FHA's upfront 
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premium was 1.5% for most of the sample period.  Loans with LTVs greater than 96.5% 
constitute almost 90% of FHA's purchase money loans, and constitute over 90% of 
FHA's claims.  Because FHA allows some closing costs to be financed, and allows the 
financing of the upfront premium, FHA loans can, in some circumstances, slightly exceed 
100% LTVs.  In this sample almost 85% of the records had LTVs in the narrow range of 
98% to 100%, and about 99% were between 95% and 101%, as conventionally defined.  
 
The median price in the national sample was $110,000.  About 99% of the loans were for 
a term of 30 years, with the remainder generally for 15.  About 6% of the loans were for 
condominiums, and about 8% of the loans were 1 year ARMs, with the balance being 
fixed rate mortgages (FHA did not offer hybrid ARMs at that time).  Just over 80% of the 
loans were to first time home buyers, and about 40% were in underserved area census 
tracts.  See Table I for sample summary statistics. 
 
 
 2.2 Source of Down Payment 
 
The Concentrance sample included 4 fields for source of gift, and 4 fields for the dollar 
amount of the gift, so that transactions involving multiple gifts could be tracked.  No 
transaction actually had 4 gifts, and only 3 out of the 8,000 transactions had 3 gifts.  The 
gift source codes identified gifts from relatives (the single largest category), gifts from 
government agencies, employers or unions, or non-profits (the second largest category).   
The coding scheme did not differentiate between seller-funded non-profits and more 
traditional non-profits.  The sample did include fields for name and Taxpayer ID Number 
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(TIN), when available, of the non-profit in the gift letter.  GAO, for its 2005 report on 
seller-funded nonprofit assistance, used the name and TIN to classify each nonprofit loan 
as seller-funded, not seller-funded, or unknown.  The latter category included both cases 
in which the named nonprofit could not be found, and nonprofits, such as Indiana's 
Habitat for Humanity, that ran both types of programs.  This was accomplished via an 
analysis of the nonprofit's website, IRS filing, or a phone call to the nonprofit.  About 94 
percent of the nonprofit assisted loans in the sample were seller-funded, with the rest 
evenly split between the not seller-funded category and the unknown category.   
   
Two indicator variables were created to indicate the source of the down payment.  One 
variable, GIFT, was set to 1 for loans where a gift was the source for at least some of the 
borrower's contribution.  The other, DAP (Down payment Assistance Program), was set 
to 1 when more than half of the gift money came from a nonprofit known to be seller-
funded, such as Nehemiah or AmeriDream.  Some attempts were made to consider the 
size of the gift as an independent variable, but in over 80% of the cases without DAP 
involvement, the gift was in the range of 2.75% to 3.75% of the sale price, while in the 
case of DAP assisted loans, more than 90% of the transactions had total gift money of 
2.75% to 3.75%.  Thus, the assistance was very close to the 3% borrower contribution 
required by FHAvii.  Therefore, there was insufficient variability to test for effects based 
on the size of the gift.  Also, there were only a handful of cases that involved assistance 
from both seller-funded nonprofits and other sources.  In most of these cases, the 
nonprofit provided the bulk of the gift funds.   
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2.3 Delinquency and Termination Data 
 
In the national sample about 17% of the loans experienced at least one episode of serious 
delinquency by September 30, 2006.  About 7.9% of the loans resulted in a claim on the 
FHA insurance by September 30, 2006, generally through foreclosure.  For the small 
number of loans with a claim that had completed the property disposition process, the 
average net loss was 38% of the original mortgage balance.  Over 80% of the loans in the 
sample had terminated by the September 30, 2006 end of the observation window, either 
through prepayment or claim termination.  Interest rates reached a local minimum in 
2003, and prepayment rates were fairly high for these cohorts. 
 
The MSA sample had higher rates of delinquency, foreclosure, and termination.  About 
20% of these loans experienced at least one episode of serious delinquency, and almost 
12% had terminated in a claim.  Loss rates were higher than those for the national sample 
in Salt Lake City and Indianapolis, but a little lower in Atlanta.  About 85% of the loans 
in the MSA sample had terminated by the end of the observation window. 
  
Figures 5 through 8 show raw delinquency and claim percentages for the National and 
MSA samples.  Loans with involvement from Down payment Assistance Program’s 
(DAPs), which effectively had no down payment, consistently showed the highest 
delinquency and claim percentages.  Loans with a down payment from a source other 
than the borrower, such as a relative or government program, had lower claim and 
delinquency propensities, while loans with down payments from the borrower’s resources 
consistently showed the lowest rates of claim and delinquency. 
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2.4 External Data 
 
These files were merged with several external sources to incorporate time-varying 
covariates for the hazard analysis.  State level unemployment rates were obtained from 
BLS, the state level constant quality house price index was obtained from OFHEO, 30- 
year fixed-rate mortgage rates were taken from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey, and one-year Treasury rates were taken from the Fed.  Price appreciation and 
unemployment were used to model the incentives to default or prepay, the 30 year 
mortgage rate was used to calculate the market value of equity for fixed rate loan default 
incentives and the ratio of market to book equity for fixed rate loan prepayment 
incentives, and the one-year Treasury rate was used to annually update the payment 
information for one-year ARMs.   
 
 
2.5 Trends 
 
In both the national and the MSA samples, gift assistance grew over time.  Use of seller-
funded nonprofit assistance grew rapidly, while gifts from other sources (primarily 
relatives) slowly declined.  In the national sample, gifts from relatives fell from 24% of 
loans in FY 2000 to 17% in FY 2002, while gifts from seller-funded nonprofits rose from 
6% to 16%.  Other gifts, such as those from employers, government agencies, or other 
nonprofits, fell from 6% to 3%.  In total, gift assisted loans rose over the 2000 to 2002 
period from 36% to 37% of FHA endorsements.viii  See Fig. 1. 
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In the MSA sample, seller-funded nonprofit assistance was a much higher percentage, 
other assistance was somewhat smaller, and overall assistance was somewhat higher than 
for the national sample.  This is because HUD chose these 3 MSAs for their high rates of 
DAP usage.  Seller-funded nonprofit assistance also grew over time.  Salt Lake City had 
the smallest percentage of DAP usage, rising from 19% to 33% between FY 2000 and FY 
2002.  Indianapolis had the largest rate of DAP usage, rising from 32% to 48% over this 
time, and Atlanta was in the middle, but rising quickly from 16% to 45%.  Total gift 
usage rose from 58% to 63% in Salt Lake City, 51% to 59% in Indianapolis, and 42% to 
59% in Atlanta.  See Figure 2. 
 
Despite the booming housing market over the 2000-2004 period, FHA claim rates have 
been rising.  Data on foreclosure initiations from the Mortgage Banker's Association 
shows FHA foreclosure initiations rising from about 0.6% in 2000 to almost 1% in 2004, 
while VA and conventional rates have stayed fairly flat. See Figure 3.  This may, in part, 
be explained by the rising incidence of assistance, especially of seller-funded assistance.  
Figures 4 through 7 show claim and delinquency rates for FHA loans by fiscal year of 
endorsement and type of assistance.   Assisted loans have consistently higher rates of 
delinquency and claim, with seller-funded assistance loans showing worse performance 
than do loans with other types of assistance.  The MSA sample has higher rates of poor 
performance, and generally larger differences between assistance categories.  This is 
consistent with the fact that the three MSAs in the sample had lower rates of house price 
appreciation than did the nation as a whole.  Atlanta, with an annual appreciation rate of 
about 5%, was just below the median for FHA loans, at 6% annual appreciation.  
 14 
Indianapolis and Salt Lake City had annual rates of appreciation of about 4%.ix 
 
3. Estimation Strategy 
 
In order to estimate the effect of the source of the down payment on claim and 
delinquency propensities, the instantaneous conditional claim (or delinquency) rate was 
modeled using James Heckman's CTM program (Yi, Walker and Honoré, 1985).  Prepaid 
loans were treated as censored on the date of prepayment.  The hazard rate framework 
was chosen to allow for the inclusion of time varying covariates, such as post origination 
price appreciation.   
 
CTM (Continuous Time Models) is a FORTRAN based package with a long history in 
labor econometrics.   It estimates competing risk termination models with a flexible 
(Box-Cox) parametric baseline hazard, and allows for the choice of any of several 
parametric forms of unobserved heterogeneity, or Heckman-Singer non-parametric 
heterogeneity (Heckman, Singer 1985).  Unobserved heterogeneity is usually referred to 
in mortgage modeling as “burnout” - the tendency for some loans to terminate faster than 
observationally similar loans, so that conditional termination rates fall over time, despite 
unchanging conditions.  Essentially, borrowers who are “slow terminators” for some 
reason not observed by the econometrician remain in the pool after all the “fast 
terminators” have left. 
 
CTM was first applied to mortgage analysis in GAO's third report on the actuarial 
soundness of the FHA single family program (GAO 1996), and has also been used to 
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model FHA multifamily mortgage terminations (Ondrich and Huang 2001).  Regressions 
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity have also been estimated with other routines.  
For example, Stanton (1996) estimates a single termination risk model of prepayment 
with a gamma heterogeneity distribution, and Deng, Quigley, and VanOrder (2000) 
estimate a competing risk model with Heckman-Singer non-parametric heterogeneity 
using McCall's software programx. 
  
CTM estimates an equation of the form 
                                                                         
  
hij(tij {x(u)}0, ) = exp{ij0 + Σ(tij + ijk)ßijk + ij(t – 1)/+ cij 
                                                                     
where i indexes the origination state (active loan), j indexes the destination state, default 
or prepayment, t is time (measured in days divided by 100), tau and beta are independent 
variables and their coefficients, lambda is the Box-Cox parameter for the baseline hazard, 
and the c's and thetas are the points of support for the non-parametric heterogeneity 
distribution and their coefficients (factor loadings). 
 
Two strategies were employed in choosing other covariates for the termination 
regression.  In one, time-invariant variables of the type used in FHA's TOTAL scorecard 
automated underwriting system were chosen.  These are FICO scorexi, LTV at 
origination, an indicator for whether the borrower will have at least 2 months of reserves 
after closing, and the Front End ratio.  These variables were augmented by other loan, 
borrower, and property variables that might influence credit risk, such as indicators for 
first time home buyers and properties in underserved areas.  A time-varying covariate is 
 16 
also included to measure post origination price appreciation.  This is defined as the state 
level percentage change in the OFHEO price index, measured quarterly.  For the first two 
quarters of the loan's life, this value is set to 1; starting with the third quarter, the value is 
calculated as the ratio of  the price index 2 quarters prior to the current quarter and the 
price index at origination (the claim process is fairly lengthy for FHA loans).     
 
The second strategy was designed to control for more covariates, despite the relatively 
small sample size (about 5,000 in the national sample and about 3,000 in the 3 MSA 
sample).  In 2001 GAO estimated competing risk hazard models using millions of FHA 
loans originated between 1975 and 1999xii.  Explanatory variables for credit risk included 
LTV at origination, an estimate of contemporaneous LTV, geographic controls for 
Census division and judicial foreclosure states, contemporaneous unemployment rates, 
and, for ARM loans, changes in payments over time.  Separate models were run for 30 
year fixed, investor, 15 year fixed, and ARM loans.  The coefficients from these 
regressions were combined with the Concentrance data to form a mortgage score, and this 
score (GAORisk), was used as an independent variable along with important variables 
not in the GAO model, such as FICO score and reserves. 
 
  
The final regressions were of the form 
 
8a) (Default t,/Survivort) = Exp(f(Risk Covariatest,, Source of Down Payment, 
Unobserved Heterogeneity)) 
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and  
 
8b) (Prepayment t,/Survivort) = Exp(f(Risk Covariatest,, Source of Down 
Payment, Unobserved Heterogeneity)) 
 
 
4.  Estimation Results 
 
Tables II.1 and III.1, present results for the national sample, with 90 day delinquencyxiii 
or claim as a termination state, and prepayment as the competing risk.  The first 
specification shows results with the GAORisk variable, which incorporates LTV, loan 
type, post-origination appreciation, unemployment rate, etc. into one combined variable, 
while the second uses the variables used by FHA in its TOTAL scorecard automated 
underwriting, in both cases augmented with other variables that might potentially 
influence credit risk.  Tables II.2 and III.2 show the same analysis for the MSA sample.  
Although CTM jointly estimates default, prepayment, and heterogeneity, in the interest of 
space the prepayment results are presented only for the national sample claim 
regressions. 
 
 Signs were as expected for both gift indicator variables.  When the dependent variable 
was 90 day delinquency, the GIFT variable indicated that serious delinquencies were 
about25% higher for loans with gift down payments, relative to comparable loans with 
down payments from the buyers’ own funds.  The DAP coefficient indicates that seller 
funded non-profit gift assistance, essentially loans with no down payment, had 
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delinquency rates about 42% higher than the rate for comparable loans with gifts from 
non-seller-funded sources.  When Claim is the dependent variable, the results are similar, 
with gift assistance raising claims by 34% to 39%, and DAP adding a further 30% to 
40%.  All estimated effects are significant at 5% for delinquency and claims.  The 
difference between DAP and other gift loans is significant at 5% in a one-tailed test for 
both claims and delinquency specifications. 
 
Results were mixed for other covariates.  The FICO score has a very strong effect with 
the expected sign, as does the Frontend ratio, and the measure of post-origination price 
appreciation.  The GAORisk variable is also positive and highly significant where in the 
claim regressions, but is not predictive in for delinquency.  Significance levels and 
goodness of fit statistics are generally better for the specification using the GAORisk 
variable, indicating the usefulness of capturing risk characteristics with a mortgage score 
in small samples where including a large number of covariates might not be feasible.  
LTV is not significant, presumably because there is so little variation in LTV in this 
sample of very high LTV loans.  Reserves are also not significant:  however, few FHA 
borrowers have significant reserves after closing.  The indicators for first time home 
buyers, condominium loans, loans where the seller was a builder (generally new 
construction), and loans in underserved areas were not significant, but there was no 
theoretical expectation for a particular sign for these variables.    
 
The heterogeneity results are similar to those found in GAO (1996) or Deng, Quigley, 
and VanOrder (2000).  For the national sample, the model estimates that there are three 
categories of borrowers, with about 50% in the very slow prepayment category, about 
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35%% in the medium speed prepayment category, and the remainder in the rapid 
prepayment category.  Because the factor loadings are opposite in sign for the claim and 
prepayment regressions, borrowers who are fast prepayers are predicted to be slow claim 
terminators, a result consistent with adverse selection at time of prepayment.  The Box-
Cox baseline hazard parameter, lambda, is negative and generally about -1, implying that 
a baseline of the form 1/time gives the best fit to the data, a remarkably sensible form for 
the baseline, as it allows a rapidly rising hazard in the early part of a loan’s life followed 
by an essentially flat hazard.  Except for GAO (1996) which finds a similar form, to the 
best of my knowledge no one has used such an inverse transform for a baseline mortgage 
termination hazard. 
 
Tables II.2 and III.2 provide results for the MSA sample.  Again, there are two 
specifications, one using the GAORisk variable, and the other using the TOTAL 
scorecard variables.  The results for source of down payment are even stronger in this set 
of cities with low price appreciation.  For delinquency, gift assistance raises the rate by 
30% to 34%, and DAP adds an additional 40%.  For claims, gift assistance raises the rate 
by 36% to 45%, and DAP adds an additional 45%.  All results are significant at 5%; 
some are significant at 1%.  Separate regressions for each MSA were tried, although not 
reported.  The sample size was too small to yield significant results, with one exception.  
When each MSA was run separately, delinquency coefficients were very similar to each 
other and the 3 MSA results, claim coefficients for DAP were slightly smaller for Atlanta 
and Indianapolis, and much higher for Salt Lake City, yielding results that were 
significant at 1% for the Salt Lake City regressions.   
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One potential disadvantage to working with conditional hazard rates is the potential for 
the competing risk of prepayment to influence the default regression results.  It would be 
possible, for example, for gift indicators to have an impact on conditional claim rates, but 
not on unconditional claim rates, if gift assisted loans had higher prepayment rates.  The 
conditional claim rates would be high, not because claims were high, but because 
survival was low.  To test for this possibility, the conditional prepayment rate was jointly 
modeled as a function of standard prepayment variables, such as the ratio of book to 
market value of the mortgage (splined at 1), standard underwriting variables, and gift 
down payment indicator variables.  CTM jointly models the competing risk of claim and 
prepayment termination (or delinquency vs. prepayment termination).  In the interest of 
space, prepayment results are only presented for the national samples (Table III.1), but 
results were similar for the MSA sample regressions.  The GIFT and DAP indicators both 
had small, negative and significant impact on prepayment rates, indicating the effect of a 
gift down payment on cumulative claim rates would be slightly higher than the estimated 
impact on conditional claim rates.   
 
Turning to loss given default, OLS regressions indicate that loss rates, defined as the 
dollars lost on a defaulted loan divided by the original mortgage balance, are influenced 
by the source of the down payment. (Table IV.1).  In both the national sample and the 
MSA samples, the presence of a gift down payment increases loss severity.  In the 
national sample, seller-funded nonprofit gifts result in loss rates 8 percentage points 
higher than other loans, while other gifts, such as gifts from relatives, have no effect.  
This is consistent with DAP gifts starting out with lower equity than that recorded in the 
underwriting.  Original mortgage amount and post origination price appreciation are also 
 21 
significant determinants of losses, with smaller losses in faster appreciating states, and 
smaller (percent) losses on larger loans, consistent with a substantial fixed cost 
component of total losses (foreclosure costs, for example).   
 
Effects are smaller in the MSA sample, and gifts in general raise loss severities.  
Examining the effects of gifts in each MSA produces some conflicting results.  In 
Atlanta, DAP gifts alone raise loss severities, while in Salt Lake City all gifts raise 
severity rates, with the biggest effect coming from non seller-funded gifts.  Neither type 
of gift has much effect in Indianapolis.  But sample sizes are fairly small for each MSA, 
and no effect is precisely estimated, except for the effect of gifts in general in Salt Lake 
City.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Both GAO (1993) and Deng, Quigley, and VanOrder (1995) estimated the cost of “no 
down payment mortgages.”  Both found the costs fairly modest, so long as house prices 
were increasing.  However, neither analyzed a program in which no cash would be 
required from the borrower.  In the 1993 GAO report, performance of no down payment 
VA mortgages was analyzed, but VA limits the closing costs that can be financed by the 
seller, so buyers are generally required to bring cash to the table to make a purchase with 
VA.  Deng , Quigley, and VanOrder extrapolated Freddie Mac borrower behavior to a 
program with 100% LTVs, but did not explicitly address closing costsxiv.  Deng, Quigley, 
and VanOrder projected 16% lifetime foreclosure rates for mid-range price appreciation 
in their worst case income and unemployment simulations.  The 3 MSAs examined in 
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this paper have comparable price appreciation to their mid-range case, and claim rates 
over 18% for the seller-funded nonprofit category, although they are only in their 5th 
through 7th years. Apparently, no cash from borrower, fully financed mortgages are even 
more risky than the Deng, Quigley, and VanOrder or 1993 GAO projections would 
indicate.  It is interesting to note that even heavily targeted affordable programs, such as 
GSE community lending programs, generally require some cash from borrowers.  For 
example, the GSEs have 3-2 programs for community lending, in which 3% of a 5% 
down payment could come from gifts, and 2% from the borrowers. 
 
This paper examines the case of literally “no money from the buyer” mortgages, and 
finds delinquencies and claim rates much higher than those for comparable loans with 
cash from the borrower.  The results for non-seller-funded gifts are not consistent with a 
“ruthless” equity driven default decision, as these loans should have equity for gifts that 
are truly gifts.  The extra difference in claim rates for gifts from seller-funded nonprofits 
is broadly consistent with an equity based explanation, as a 20% increase in claims for a 
3% decrease in equity (this assumes that 3% seller-funded assistance yields a 3% increase 
in sales price) is consistent with results from FHA termination models that included a 
broad range of LTVs, such as GAO's 1996 FHA actuarial model.   
 
The results are consistent with most non seller-funded gifts being true gifts, and with the 
implications of Krumm and Kelly, or Haurin, Wachter, and Hendershott’s work on 
transitions to homeownership.  Some renters are flexible, able to adjust consumption and 
labor force participation, and these renters are better positioned to save for down 
payments.  Mortgage market innovations that allow borrowers to purchase with no 
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savings may lower the bar to less flexible households, who are at greater risk in the face 
of price downturns or trigger events.   
 
The results would also be consistent with a moral hazard problem.  Borrowers may be 
more willing to undertake risky investments, such as buying from a developer without a 
track record, or purchasing a property in areas with high price volatility, if they are not 
investing any of their own funds. The evidence here is fairly indirect – borrowers with no 
cash invested have higher delinquency and claim rates, but nothing is known about prior 
earnings and saving behavior for these borrowers.  Further research should be done along 
the lines of Boehm (1993), Krumm and Kelly, Reid (2005), or Haurin, Wachter, and 
Hendershott, to examine the earnings and savings histories of home buyers who make use 
of gift assistance, and determine the extent to which saving and earning flexibility may 
explain these higher claim rates. 
 
Because of the prevalence of subprime refinancing over this time period, and the large 
numbers of mortgages from this sample that terminated in prepayment, the 15% to 20% 
claims to date found for gift down payment mortgages in slowly appreciating MSAs are 
likely to be a lower bound estimate of the rate of “homeownership failure.”  It is still 
fairly early in the lives of these mortgages, and an unknown number may terminate in 
foreclosure in the future.  Additionally, many of these no-cash-from-borrower mortgages 
may have terminated through a refinancing, with the new mortgage later terminating in a 
claim, as over half of these borrowers prepaid within 4 years.  Some prepayments may 
also be from borrowers who exited homeownership but avoided an investment loss. This 
work may confirm the results of Reid, who finds that many low to moderate income first 
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time homebuyers transit back to rental status in the first five years. 
 
This research does make clear that, for whatever reason, borrowers with no cash invested 
in the transaction have higher credit risk than comparable buyers who bring cash to the 
transaction.  Designers of government assistance programs, mortgage insurers or other 
holders of credit risk, and planners concerned about pockets of foreclosure in 
neighborhoods should take these elevated risks into account. 
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Table I.1             
  
Summary Statistics             
  
       
  
 National Sample Atlanta Sample Indianap Sample Salt Lake Sample 
Variables Mean Sigma Mean Sigma Mean Sigma Mean Sigma 
           
  
Dependent           
  
Cumulative delinquent rate 17.0%  21.4%  23.2%  14.0%  
Cumulative claim rate 6.9%  9.7%  13%  9.6%  
Cumulative prepay rate 75.1%  69.5%  67.3%  83.4%  
Loss severity rate 0.38 0.247 0.277 0.136 0.525 0.175 0.416 0.148 
 
        
Time Invariant Independent        
frontend ratio 0.258 0.076 0.266 0.068 0.244 0.067 0.290 0.067 
LTV ratio 0.990 0.012 0.988 0.012 0.990 0.007 0.986 0.016 
FICO (/100) 6.553 0.611 6.424 0.587 6.472 0.670 6.672 0.574 
NoFICO 7.6%  7.6%  5.8%  12.0%  
reserves < 2 months 28.0%  24.0%  23.3%  24.0%  
Underserved area 40.8%  41.5%  26.6%  39.6%  
condominium 8.4%  4.2%  3.3%  12.0%  
first time buyer 80.9%  81.7%  82.2%  84.5%  
ARM 7.0%  9.8%  11.3%  13.2%  
DAP 9.9%  31.9%  40.2%  28.1%  
Gift 35.0%  50.9%  54.7%  62.2%  
         
Time Varying Independent        
 29 
GAOrisk 7.04 2.14 6.80 1.90 6.35 2.07 6.33 2.15 
Growth 1.10 0.13 1.07 0.07 1.05 0.05 1.03 0.04 
         
N observations 5097  1177  1126  1110  
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Table II.1  National Delinquency 
  
       
       
 
Coefficient Std.Error 
p-
value Coefficient Std.error 
p-
value 
       
       
Intercept 3.562 0.477 0.001 9.779 3.125 0.002 
DAPGift 0.671 0.103 0.001 0.664 0.104 0.001 
OtherGift 0.252 0.086 0.002 0.257 0.085 0.001 
GAORisk 0.071 0.022 0.001    
Growth    0.147 0.224 0.255 
LTV    -0.056 0.031 0.033 
ARM    -0.423 0.150 0.002 
FICO -0.958 0.066 0.001 -0.986 0.064 0.001 
NoFICO 0.468 0.116 0.001 0.451 0.116 0.001 
Reserves 0.105 0.084 0.106 0.130 0.084 0.061 
FrontEnd 1.144 0.501 0.011 1.184 0.502 0.009 
Underserved -0.005 0.073 0.943 -0.014 0.073 0.851 
Condominium -0.133 0.151 0.379 -0.238 0.163 0.146 
FirstTime -0.097 0.104 0.352 -0.119 0.105 0.254 
Builder -0.055 0.109 0.615 -0.087 0.108 0.424 
Gamma 1.265 0.092 0.001 1.356 0.106 0.001 
Lambda 0.745 0.134 0.001 0.599 0.109 0.001 
Factor_Load 0.152 0.292 0.604 0.215 0.267 0.421 
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Unobserved Cumulative  
 
Cumulative  
 
Heterogeneity Probability Location 
 
Probability Location 
 
       
 0.492 0.000  0.139 0.000  
 0.851 0.397  0.432 0.612  
 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  
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Table II.2  MSA Delinquency 
  
       
       
 
Coefficient Std.Error 
p-
value Coefficient Std.error 
p-
value 
       
       
Intercept 1.353 0.622 0.030 1.404 5.336 0.792 
DAPGift 0.742 0.112 0.001 0.688 0.106 0.001 
OtherGift 0.343 0.129 0.004 0.298 0.125 0.009 
GAORisk 0.150 0.031 0.001    
Growth    3.947 1.039 0.001 
LTV    -0.026 0.053 0.310 
ARM    -0.303 0.120 0.006 
FICO -0.874 0.081 0.001 -0.803 0.076 0.001 
NoFICO 0.404 0.134 0.001 0.365 0.127 0.002 
Reserves 0.061 0.110 0.289 0.043 0.106 0.341 
FrontEnd 2.616 0.660 0.001 2.032 0.629 0.001 
Underserved 0.101 0.090 0.263 0.054 0.084 0.520 
Condominium 0.143 0.195 0.463 0.141 0.201 0.481 
FirstTime -0.075 0.123 0.544 -0.029 0.116 0.806 
Builder -0.085 0.098 0.382 -0.004 0.092 0.966 
Gamma 1.694 0.162 0.001 0.465 0.195 0.017 
Lambda 0.887 0.140 0.001 -0.137 0.269 0.609 
Factor_Load 1.565 0.309 0.001 -0.077 0.264 0.771 
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Unobserved Cumulative  
 
Cumulative  
 
Heterogeneity Probability Location 
 
Probability Location 
 
       
 0.139 0.000  0.228 0.000  
 0.359 0.633  0.397 0.667  
 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  
 Table III.1  National Claims 
  
Claims 
      
 
Coefficient Std.Error p.value Coefficient Std.error p.value 
Intercept 0.605 0.882 0.493 13.602 6.363 0.033 
DAPGift 0.796 0.171 0.001 0.664 0.171 0.001 
OtherGift 0.390 0.142 0.003 0.337 0.142 0.009 
GAORisk 0.163 0.037 0.001    
Growth    -4.154 0.742 0.001 
LTV    -0.057 0.064 0.185 
ARM    -0.645 0.289 0.013 
FICO -0.843 0.119 0.001 -0.876 0.115 0.001 
NoFICO 0.878 0.181 0.001 0.869 0.180 0.001 
Reserves -0.085 0.146 0.281 -0.077 0.145 0.297 
FrontEnd 1.499 0.853 0.039 2.317 0.858 0.003 
Underserved -0.023 0.122 0.849 0.039 0.121 0.744 
Condominium -0.276 0.290 0.341 -0.255 0.312 0.413 
FirstTime -0.308 0.158 0.051 -0.289 0.156 0.064 
Builder 0.174 0.170 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Gamma 0.433 0.184 0.018 1.345 0.224 0.001 
Lambda -1.446 0.393 0.001 -0.615 0.220 0.005 
Factor_Load 1.057 0.706 0.135 -0.667 0.596 0.263 
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Prepayment 
      
Intercept -10.111 0.765 0.001 -12.159 2.923 0.001 
DAPGift -0.237 0.086 0.006 -0.188 0.088 0.031 
OtherGift -0.076 0.061 0.211 -0.047 0.062 0.448 
GAORisk -0.141 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Growth 0.000 0.000 0.001 2.838 0.247 0.001 
LTV 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.091 0.028 0.001 
ARM 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.113 0.116 0.001 
FICO 0.415 0.044 0.001 0.408 0.043 0.001 
NoFICO -0.372 0.093 0.001 -0.315 0.096 0.001 
Reserves 0.072 0.058 0.216 0.045 0.059 0.439 
FrontEnd 2.094 0.342 0.001 1.594 0.344 0.001 
Underserved -0.244 0.052 0.001 -0.301 0.052 0.001 
Condominium 0.248 0.095 0.009 -0.020 0.105 0.848 
FirstTime -0.278 0.066 0.001 -0.277 0.066 0.001 
Builder 0.073 0.074 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.001 
releqphi 4.631 0.230 0.001 5.070 0.225 0.001 
releqplo 4.110 0.723 0.001 5.789 0.795 0.001 
Gamma 0.379 0.082 0.001 0.029 0.017 0.086 
Lambda -0.494 0.123 0.001 -1.499 0.265 0.001 
factor_loading -3.413 0.375 0.001 4.495 0.296 0.001 
       
Unobserved Cumulative  
 
Cumulative  
 
Heterogeneity Probability Location 
 
Probability Location 
 
 0.495 0.000  0.133 0.000  
 0.840 0.458  0.430 0.574  
 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  
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Table III.2  MSA Claims  
  
       
       
 
Coefficient Std.Error 
p-
value Coefficient Std.error 
p-
value 
       
       
Intercept -1.141 0.750 0.128 7.230 10.262 0.481 
DAPGift 0.909 0.143 0.001 0.797 0.142 0.001 
OtherGift 0.449 0.168 0.004 0.362 0.169 0.016 
GAORisk 0.214 0.038 0.001    
Growth    -6.894 1.510 0.001 
LTV    0.009 0.104 0.467 
ARM    -0.381 0.176 0.015 
FICO -0.407 0.105 0.001 -0.443 0.101 0.001 
NoFICO 0.596 0.154 0.001 0.526 0.153 0.001 
Reserves 0.081 0.142 0.284 0.037 0.139 0.396 
FrontEnd 1.984 0.848 0.010 1.951 0.827 0.009 
Underserved 0.111 0.111 0.318 0.162 0.108 0.134 
Condominium 0.145 0.241 0.547 0.116 0.290 0.688 
FirstTime -0.006 0.160 0.968 0.032 0.155 0.839 
Builder 0.010 0.125 0.935 -0.026 0.123 0.834 
Gamma 0.975 0.246 0.001 1.624 0.299 0.001 
Lambda -1.122 0.356 0.002 -0.643 0.267 0.016 
Factor_Load -1.081 0.485 0.026 -0.195 0.450 0.665 
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Unobserved Cumulative  
 
Cumulative  
 
Heterogeneity Probability Location 
 
Probability Location 
 
       
 0.610 0.000  0.228 0.000  
 0.855 0.466  0.403 0.532  
 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  
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Table IV.1 
        
 
Loss Rates 
        
 
          
 
 
National Sample MSA Sample Atlanta Sample Indianap Sample Salt Lake Sample 
 Parameter T Parameter T Parameter T Parameter T Parameter T 
Intercept 0.82164 0.46 -1.74091 1.08 3.51942 1.02 -1.24329 0.57 0.42684 0.17 
LTV -0.00199 0.11 0.03921 2.32 -0.03357 0.57 0.02834 1.22 0.02007 0.76 
DAP 0.08311 2.04 0.03043 1.25 0.03603 0.89 -0.02722 0.86 0.03626 0.84 
OtherGift -0.00381 0.11 0.02727 0.91 -0.01526 0.48 -0.01179 0.28 0.07301 1.53 
FICO -6E-05 0.21 -0.00017 0.85 -0.00018 0.76 -0.00016 0.69 -0.00045 1.22 
NoFICO 0.06169 1.42 -0.00996 0.36 0.01466 0.66 0.07097 1.46 -0.02079 0.6 
Growth -0.14589 0.88 -0.80961 4.01 0.16889 0.11 -0.23663 0.72 -1.77617 3.82 
Interest 0.04052 2.15 0.00288 0.03 -0.00683 0.97 0.01971 1.54 0.02268 1.1 
UPB -5.5E-06 2.91 -1.2E-05 4.36 1.07E-06 0.58 -1.40E-05 3.94 1.27E-06 0.23 
UPB sq 1.25E-11 1.45 4.15E-11 3.2 -6.62E-12 0.27 5.53E-11 3.03 -1.41E-11 0.55 
           
N of 
Observations 233  289  80  118  91  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
Gift Usage - MSA Sample  
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Mortgage Bankers Association..  
Note:  Conventional category dropped in 2004, Prime category added in 1997.
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
Delinquency - MSA Sample 
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Figure 6 
 
Claim Rates - National Sample 
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Figure 7 
 
Claim Rates - MSA Sample 
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iFor a recent review of the literature on mortgage credit risk, see US GAO (2005a). 
iiThe HUD IG studies included reviews of paper files that found numerous instances of appraisal and sale 
prices scratched out, and new appraisal and sale prices, equal to the scratched-out price plus the amount of 
gift assistance, written over the old prices.  The GAO study compared the ratio of sale price or appraisal to 
the results of an automated valuation model, and found that sales and appraisals averaged 3% higher for 
transactions with non-profit gift assistance.   
iiiSee Concentrance Consulting Group (2004). 
ivThe other file was collected by HUD as part of their development of FHA's automated underwriting 
algorithm.  The loan years covered precede the widespread proliferation of down payment assistance 
programs.  See Cotterman (2004). 
v
 Because of this updating, figures for loan performance characteristics and time-varying variables will 
differ from those in the GAO report, which used an earlier as-of date. 
viIn September 2005 FHA imposed a moratorium on loan foreclosures for counties and parishes affected by 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Most of Louisiana, much of south Florida, Mississippi and Alabama, and the 
northeast corner of Texas were included.  Loans in the affected counties or parishes that were still active 
are treated as censored in September 2005.  This affected less than 1 percent of the loans in the national 
sample. 
vii
“3 percent down payment” is the usual short hand summary of FHA requirements.  Technically, there is a 
fairly complex formula using the purchase price, closing costs, and the location of the loan in a high or low 
cost state that determines the required contribution from the borrower.  But the result of the formula is a 
cash requirement between 2.75 and 3.5 percent.  Although FHA allows the financing of some closing costs, 
and allows limited direct closing cost assistance from sellers, borrowers (or approved sources such as 
relatives or non-profits) are required to invest about 3 percent in cash.  It is this 3 percent that FHA does 
not allow to come directly from the seller, but is allowed to come from a non-profit funded by the seller.  
viiiThe 2005 GAO report indicates a continuing growth in assistance post 2002.  Incomplete data from the 
first half of FY 2005 indicated that seller-funded nonprofits were involved in 37% of FHA purchase 
endorsements with LTV's greater than 95% (FHA definition of LTV), and 55% of high LTV FHA purchase 
loans had assistance of some sort. 
                                                                                                                                                  
46 
ixFHA has a fairly small market share in most of the rapidly appreciating states, such as California or 
Massachusetts, so the average appreciation rate for FHA loans is below the average for the US.  Salt Lake 
City had the lowest appreciation rate of the 3 MSAs up to the end of the observation window, but 
appreciation increased dramatically at the end of 2005. 
x
 A non parametric baseline with competing risks and unobserved heterogeneity, as in McCall’s program, 
has to be estimated with some care, as unreliable results may be obtained from singularities.  See Ridder 
and Woutersen (2003). 
xiAbout 8% of the borrowers did not have a FICO score.  For these cases, the median FICO score for the 
sample was inserted, and a dummy variable (NOFICO) was set to 1.  The results, therefore, show the extent 
to which borrowers without a FICO score are riskier than borrowers with a median score. 
xiiThe model, for GAO's fourth study of FHA actuarial soundness, is documented in US GAO (2001). 
xiiiTechnically, the dependent variable indicates 90 day delinquency, or other “bad outcomes” such as the 
initiation of foreclosure proceedings or negotiation of a loss mitigation foreclosure alternative.  Although 
lenders are supposed to report delinquencies to FHA after 90 days, it is sometimes the case that a 
delinquency is never reported but the loan appears as a claim or claim alternative.  In about 90% of the 
“delinquencies” in this file, the event is 90 day delinquency. 
xiv
 Most conventional “100% LTV” products also require some cash from the borrower for closing costs. 
